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I. INTRODUCTION 
The dispute between Appellants Bums Concrete, Inc. ("Bums Concrete"), and Canyon 
Cove Development Company, LLP ("Canyon Cove," and together with Bums Concrete 
"Defendants"), and Respondents Nora A. Mulberry ("Mulberry") and TN Properties LLC 
Qointly with Mulberry "Plaintiffs") arises out of the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire 
Interest in Real Property (the "ROFR") attached as Exhibit A to Appellants' Brief. 
None of the factual statements contained in either the Summary of the Proceedings in the 
District Court or the Summary of Facts, which are set forth at pages 2-8 of Appellants' Brief, are 
disputed by Plaintiffs, except to the following limited extent: 
Mulberry disagrees with paragraph 6 to the extent it 
contains a selection of provisions from the Right of First Refusal 
("ROFR") which Appellants deem material, with selective 
highlighting. Appellants' Brief, p. 5. The remainder of the 
paragraph consists of argument.[ll Id. Mulberry contends that the 
ROFR is a document which speaks for itself. 
As to paragraph 13, Mulberry agrees that the Kirk Bums 
affidavit contains the language set forth in Appellants' Brief, p. 7. 
However, Mulberry disagrees that such affidavit contains only 
facts. The last sentence of the second paragraph and the entire 
1 The remainder of "paragraph 6" referenced by Plaintiffs provides: 
Thus, the ROFR is a stand-alone contract that does not refer to any 
other transaction or property, states that it is based on adequate 
consideration, provides for its renewal or continuation in the event 
the encumbered property is not sold, and provides for notices to be 
given through recordation in the real property records - which 
together establish that the ROFR was intended to bind both 
Mulberry and her property. 
Appellants' Brief 5. 
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third paragraph (as copied into Appellants' Brief) consistent of 
opinion and/or argument, with which Mulberry disagreesYl 
Respondent's Brief 6. 
Plaintiffs, however, point to nothing in the record and provide no explanation establishing 
how or why the summary quoted in note 1 is not factually accurate. Nor do Plaintiffs point to 
anything in the record or provide any explanation establishing how or why the summary quoted 
in note 2 below is not factually accurate. Moreover, Kirk Bums establishes in his affidavit that, 
as the president of Burns Concrete, he is competent to provide the opinions quoted in note 2.3 
Cf Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295, 306, 971 P.2d 1119, 
1130 (1998) (holding that the plaintiffs president was competent to testify as to damage 
valuations based on "the rule that the owner of property is qualified to testify to its value"). 
2 The portion of "paragraph 13" referenced by Plaintiffs provides: 
For these reasons, there is no requirement for or benefit in the 
consistent use of the two properties, whether for farming, 
residential development, mining of aggregate materials, or 
otherwise. 
For the foregoing reasons, neither the value nor the use of 
the Purchased Property ( or, for that matter, any of Burns 
Concrete's additional acreage) would in any manner be enhanced 
by Burns Concrete's ownership of the ROFR Property, nor would 
the Purchased Property otherwise be benefitted by common 
ownership of it and the ROFR Property. 
Appellants' Brief 7. 
3 Second Affidavit of Kirk Bums, filed February 15, 2017 ("2d Burns A.ff.) [R, pp. 63-
65]. 
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Plaintiffs' quoted criticisms of the summaries provided in notes 1 and 2 are thus without factual 
or legal basis. 
Accordingly, because the factual contentions set forth in Appellants' Brief are not at issue 
and Plaintiffs present no additional factual contentions in support of their argument, the pending 
appeal should be decided by this Court's determination of the law applicable to the facts 
presented by Defendants in their opening brief. 
II. RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Address Essential Legal Arguments In Appellants' Brief. 
As Defendants argue in their opening brief: 
Defendants respectfully submit that there are but the following 
three alternative possibilities here in play, none of which support 
the conclusion that the ROFR was extinguished by its assignment 
to Burns Concrete: 
• If the ROFR is not "personal" to Canyon Cove, then Bums 
Concrete may exercise the ROFR irrespective of whether it 
is "appurtenant" to the Purchased Property, which Bums 
Concrete owns. 
• If the ROFR is "personal" to Canyon Cove but not 
"appurtenant" to the Purchased Property, then Canyon 
Cove may exercise the ROFR if either (a) Canyon Cove's 
attempted assignment of the ROFR was void[4l, or (b) if it 
was effective, Burns Concrete assigns the ROFR back to 
Canyon Cove by the deadline for its exercise. 
• If the ROFR is both "personal" to Canyon Cove and 
"appurtenant" to the Purchased Property, then Canyon 
Cove may exercise the ROFR if both (a) Canyon Cove's 
4 Plaintiffs contend that "the assignment of the ROFR to Burns Concrete is void[,]" and 
not "extinguished." Respondent's Brief 13. 
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attempted assignment of the ROFR was void or. if it was 
effective, Burns Concrete assigns the ROFR back to 
Canyon Cove by the deadline for the ROFR' s exercise, and 
(b) Canyon Cove reacquires the Purchased Property by the 
deadline for the ROFR' s exercise. 
In sum, irrespective of whether the ROFR is held to be 
personal to Canyon Cove or appurtenant to the Purchased Property, 
it may yet be exercised in accordance with each of its express and 
implied terms. And that the ROFR is not "extinguished" under 
such circumstances is made manifest by the fact that there is but 
one known state or federal opinion deciding that a legal contract 
may be held void while it may yet be exercised in accordance with 
all of its applicable terms - an outlier opinion discussed and 
distinguished in part A(iv) below that the district court itself ruled 
was "insufficient to conclude that a personal ROFR is extinguished 
upon its invalid assignment." 2nd MSJ Decision 7 [R, p. 80]. 
Appellants' Brief 12-13 (underscoring added) (footnote omitted). 
Although Plaintiffs argue that the ROFR is both "personal" to Canyon Cove and 
"appurtenant" to the property sold by Mulberry and her deceased husband to Canyon Cove, and 
then subsequently re-sold to Bums Concrete (which is defined as the "Purchased Property" in 
Appellants' Brief) - and if so the first two of the quoted alternatives would be inapplicable -
Plaintiffs wholly fail to even mention the third alternative or the remainder of Defendants' 
argument quoted above. Thus, as also argued in Appellants' Brief and not disputed by Plaintiffs: 
The law in Idaho relating to the treatment of a right of first 
refusal for the purchase of land as being a personal contract or 
servitude, or as being appurtenant to real property, or as running 
with the land has not been addressed by either of Idaho's appellate 
courts. But no matter whether this Court determines the ROFR to 
be personal to Canyon Cove and/or appurtenant to the Purchased 
Property, the ROFR may yet be exercised in accordance with each 
of its expressed and implied terms if and when notice is given by 
Plaintiffs of their intent to sell the ROFR Property. And for this 
-4-
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elemental reason, this Court should reverse the district court's 
ruling that the ROFR was "extinguished" by Canyon Cove's 
assignment to Burns Concrete. 
Appellants' Brief 29 (underscoring added). 
Plaintiffs also fail to even mention, let alone rebut, any of the arguments or authorities 
discussed at pages 20-29 of Appellants' Brie-f establishing why the district court erred in holding 
that the ROFR was "extinguished" by Canyon Cove's assignment of it to Burns Concrete. 
Based on the Plaintiffs having failed to address the foregoing arguments, this Court could 
reverse the district court's determination that the ROFR was extinguished without addressing the 
arguments that were raised by Plaintiffs and are rebutted below. Even so, because the questions 
of whether the ROFR is personal to Canyon Cove and appurtenant to the Purchased Property 
have been fully briefed by the parties, and because this Court's determination of these two 
questions will end the litigation over the questions without a future appeal to this Court, 
Defendants respectfully request that the Court decide both the "personal" and "appurtenant" 
questions. 
B. Rebuttal Of Plaintiffs' Legal Argument. 
Plaintiffs' opposition to the arguments made in Appellants' Brief are centered on the 
following contention: 
The district court held that (1) the burden of the ROFR constituted 
a servitude on the ROFR Property that runs with the land; and (2) 
5 See Appellants' Brief at part IV.A(iii) (titled, Legal Principles Applicable to Rights of 
First Refusal and Their Assignment) and part IV.A(iv) (titled, Discussion and Analysis of 
Known Adverse Authority). 
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the benefit of the ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove and was 
appurtenant to the Purchased Property. (R., pp. 58 & 92). 
Respondent's Brief 7 (emphasis in original). Defendants, however, have read and reread the 
cited pages of the district court's two memorandum decisions and found no articulated "holding" 
in them supporting Plaintiffs' contention. 
Nevertheless, the district court, Plaintiffs, and Defendants all concur that the burden of 
the ROFR constitutes a servitude on the ROFR Property that runs with the land, leaving the 
questions of whether the benefit of the ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove and/or appurtenant 
to the Purchased Property for this Court to decide. 
(i) The ROFR Should Not Be Held to Be a Personal, Nonassignable Contract. 
Neither of Idaho's appellate courts has decided the question of whether a right of first 
refusal is a personal contract that may not be assigned by the person granted a right to purchase. 
And although Defendants acknowledge that the majority of courts having decided the question 
have held for a variety of reasons that such rights are personal to the grantee, the principles 
adopted by Idaho's appellate courts and discussed in part IV.A(iii) of Appellants' Brief support 
this Court holding that a right of first refusal should be assignable unless the right of first refusal 
were to state otherwise. Plaintiffs' concurrence that the ROFR in this dispute runs with the 
ROFR Property supports such a holding here, for the elemental reason that parties to contracts 
that run with the land understand that such contracts are not personal to the contracting parties 
absent express language to the contrary. Indeed, this Court now holding otherwise will likely 
surprise numerous other parties holding their own rights of first refusal. 
-6-
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(ii) The ROFR Should Not Be Held to Be Appurtenant to the Purchase Property. 
As also quoted in Appellants' Brief, the factual basis for the district court's holding that 
the ROFR is appurtenant to the Purchased Property was limited to the following argument: 
"Though the properties are not contiguous, the proximity between the Purchased Property and 
the ROFR Property, makes the use of the ROFR Property arguably more useful to the owner of 
the Purchased Property than to an independent party who does not own nearby property." R, 
p.91 (underscoring added). And just as the district court cited nothing in the record to support its 
ruling, Plaintiffs also argue without citing anything in the record or identifying any of their 
alleged "numerous ways": "There are numerous ways in which property across the street and 
one parcel over from a person's own property would be 'more useful' to that person than to 
someone not owning any property nearby." Respondent's Brief 12. Thus, although both the 
district court and Plaintiffs argue that the ROFR Property may be more useful to the owner of 
the Purchased Property than to other persons, neither the district court nor Plaintiffs point to any 
specific reasons or evidence in the record to support their argument. 
Conversely, Defendants cite to the following specific reasons and undisputed facts in the 
record to establish that the ROFR is no more useful to Burns Concrete, as the current owner of 
the Purchased Property, than the ROFR would be to its former owner Canyon Cove 6: 
6 See Respondent's Brief 12 ("A servitude is appurtenant 'if it serves a purpose that 
would be more useful to a successor to a property interest held by the original beneficiary of the 
servitude at the time the servitude was created than it would be to the original beneficiary after 
transfer of the interest to a successor."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: 
SERVITUDES (2000) § 4.5(1)(a)). 
-7-
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• That the Purchased Property is located between and 
adjacent to two additional parcels (one 50 acres and the 
other 35 acres) owned by Bums Concrete, with all of the 
Purchased Property being on the north side of 81 st South in 
Bonneville County and with four residential properties 
constructed along 81 st South lying between the road and 
the Purchased Property. 
• That the ROFR Property is located across the road from 
Bums Concrete's 50-acre parcel on the south side of 81st 
South and to the west of the Purchased Property. 
• That not only is the ROFR Property not in any manner 
adjacent or physically "connected" to (nor directly across 
the road from) the Purchased Property, but the two 
properties share no common irrigation system or other 
utilities, have no common means of ingress or egress, and 
are subject to no common easements or restrictions by 
which one of the properties benefits the other - and for 
these reasons, there is no requirement for or benefit in the 
consistent use of the two properties, whether for farming, 
residential development, mining of aggregate materials, or 
otherwise. 
• And that for all the foregoing reasons. neither the value nor 
the use of the Purchased Property (or. for that matter. any 
of Bums Concrete's additional acreage) would in any 
manner be enhanced by Bums Concrete's ownership of the 
ROFR Property. nor would the Purchased Property 
otherwise be benefitted by common ownership of it and the 
ROFR Property. 
Appellants' Brief 15-16 (underscoring added) (citations to 2d Burns Aff. omitted). 
Moreover, and as previously mentioned, Kirk Bums, as the president of Bums Concrete 
(the owner of the Purchased Property), is competent under Idaho precedent to establish each of 
the factual matters quoted above. Empire Lumber Co., supra, 132 Idaho at 306, 971 P.2d at 
1130. 
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Accordingly, based on the authorities set forth in Appellants' Brief at part IV.A(ii) (titled, 
The ROFR Is Not Appurtenant to the Purchased Property), this Court should rule that the ROFR 
is not appurtenant to the Purchased Property and that the ROFR may therefore be exercised by its 
lawful holder, whether that be Canyon Cove (because its assignment of the ROFR is void as it 
pertains to Plaintiffs) or Burns Concrete (because the ROFR may be assigned under Idaho law). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above and in Appellants' Brief, Defendants request this Court 
(a) to reverse the district court's determination that the ROFR was extinguished and that 
Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in the proceedings below, together with the district court's 
award of attorney fees and costs to Plaintiffs, and (b) to award Defendants their attorney fees and 
costs on appeal. 
DATED this 7th day of May 2018. 
PARSONS BEHLE ~ TIMER 
By (_ ;{ )--
Robert B. BuMs 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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